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Notes
Federal Jurisdiction over Preemption Claims:
A Post-FranchiseTax Board Analysist
I. Introduction
As Congress uses the commerce power to regulate areas of the

economy previously controlled by the states,' federal statutes conflict
with state law with increasing frequency. 2 When such conflicts occur,
t The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor Charles Alan Wright for his kind
assistance throughout the preparation of this piece.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power. . . [t]o regulate
Commerce. . . among the several States.
... Congressional power to regulate commerce has
not always been as extensive as it is now. In United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895),
the Court held that the Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1982)), could not be applied constitutionally to prohibit monopolies in manufacture. The
rationale of this decision was that manufacture (as opposed to transport and sale across state lines)
was not "commerce" within the meaning of the Constitution. Later cases broadened the scope of
regulable commerce to include any activity bearing a "close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce." The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 355 (1914) (allowing federal regulation of
wholly intrastate railroad routes). This rule, however, still prohibited congressional regulation of
many local economic enterprises under the commerce clause. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down congressional prohibition of interstate commerce in goods
produced with child labor).
This distinction between local and national economic enterprises gave way entirely after the
Great Depression. The complete demise of restrictions on congressional exercise of the commerce
power occurred in Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. I 11(1942), in which the Court held that the
Secretary of Agriculture, acting under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, could impose a statutory
marketing penalty on a farmer for growing excess wheat. Growing wheat "on a small farm in
Montgomery County, Ohio" was held to be an act of interstate commerce. 317 U.S. at 112.
Congress has responded by basing many statutes on the commerce power, including the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1982). Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969),
demonstrated the boundless reach of congressional power under that statute. In that case, a private club near Little Rock, Arkansas placed newspaper advertisements aimed at an audience
known to include interstate travelers. The Court held that in placing these advertisements, the
club had engaged in interstate commerce. Id. at 304. As an alternative ground of decision, the
Court found that the club's sales of hot dogs and soft drinks could be presumed to be sales of food
moving in interstate commerce. Id at 305. For a general discussion of the modern scope of the
commerce power, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5-4 to -8 (1978).
2. Perhaps the most notable of these preemptive federal statutes is the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). One recent statute producing a great amount of preemption litigation is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 103
S. Ct. 2890 (1983); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841
(1983); Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1982), af/'dmem sub noma.
Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 103 S. Ct. 3564 (1983); Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919
(N.D. Cal. 1978), ai'd,632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
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federal law "preempts ' 3 the state law under the supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution. 4 Litigants who foresee a preemption
issue often seek a declaratory judgment of preemption or nonpreemption in order to clarify their rights and duties.5 This Note addresses the
scope of federal question jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions in which preemption is the only federal question raised.
The issue of federal jurisdiction is important both for its ramifications for our federal system and because of its effect on the litigation
strategy and outcome of particular cases. In general, the party relying
on state law tries to maintain the action in state court, where the preemption claim is unlikely to be sympathetically received. 6 The party
asserting preemption, on the other hand, attempts to bring the action in
federal court under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (FDJA) 7 or
3. For the purposes of this Note, the term "preempt" refers to the effect of the federal constitution and federal statutes on conflicting state statutes, constitutional provisions, and common
law. Any state law inconsistent with an element of federal law is preempted under the supremacy
clause of the U.S. Constitution. See infra note 4.
4. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States. . .shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
5. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983); Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S.Ct. 2841 (1983); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
6. Chief Justice Marshall foresaw the problem of state court bias against federal claims
when he stated:
[W]ords obviously intended to secure to those who claim rights under the constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States, a trial in the federal Courts, will be restricted to the
insecure remedy of an appeal upon an insulated point, after it has received that shape
which may be given to it by another [state] tribunal, into which he is forced against his
will.
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822-23 (1824). The gravity of this
problem is evident from the case law interpreting important federal statutes, in which federal
courts frequently overrule state courts' restrictive applications of federal law. See, e.g., Fidelity
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (reversing a California Supreme
Court decision that refused to apply regulations promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board under the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959) (reversing a California court's acceptance ofjurisdiction over a labor dispute
governed by the National Labor Relations Act); New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147
(1917) (reversing a New York Court of Appeals decision granting a workers' compensation award
under terms which contravened the Federal Employers' Liability Act); Stone v. Stone, 450 F.
Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (refusing to enforce a California divorce decree issued contrary to the
terms of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974), affd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982). This Note assumes that the same jurisdictional boundaries apply whether the complaint seeks an injunction, a declaratory judgment, or both. Support exists in
the case law for several positions.
The Ninth Circuit, in Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 716 F.2d 1285 (9th
Cir. 1983), found that the jurisdictional requirements were stricter for complaints seeking declaratory judgments than for complaints seeking injunctions. Under the Ninth Circuit's view, joinder
of a claim for an injunction to a claim seeking only a declaratory judgment would alter the jurisdictional result. This view was based on Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 2890 (1983). In
that case, the Court noted that it was "beyond dispute" that federal courts could enjoin state
officials in preemption cases. Id at 2899 n.14; see infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. The
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to remove the action to federal court if he is a state court defendant.
Declaratory judgment actions raising a federal preemption issue
fall into five categories:
(1) A private party sues a state for a declaration that state law has
been preempted. 8

(2) A state sues a private party for a declaration that state law has
not been preempted.9
(3) A state sues a private party for a declaration that state law has
been preempted. ' 0
(4) A private party sues a state for a declaration that state law has
been
preempted.tI
not
(5) A private party sues another private party for a declaration of
t2
preemption or nonpreemption.
In Part II, this Note surveys the early Supreme Court decisions
establishing the basic rules for federal question jurisdiction in FDJA
actions. In Part III, it examines the application of these rules to cases
falling in the first four patterns above-cases between states and private parties. In Part IV, this Note examines the application of these
rules to the fifth type-suits involving only private parties. The traditional view is that Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley,13 as
applied to FDJA actions in Skelly Oil Co. v. PhilipsPetroleum Co. ,14
Ninth Circuit took this as an implied rejection of federal jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgments in the same cases. 716 F.2d at 1288.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Sneed questioned this conclusion. He argued that insofar as
jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (providing jurisdiction for cases arising under
federal law), the jurisdictional issue should be entirely unaffected by the nature of the relief
sought. 716 F.2d at 1291. The language of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act itself supports
this conclusion: "[Any court. . . may declare the rights. . . of any. . . party. . . whether or not
further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982) (emphasis added).
A third solution was presented in Board of Elec. Light Comn'rs v. McCarren, 563 F. Supp.
374 (D. Vt. 1982), afd, 725 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1983). This court concluded that a complaint
seeking only a declaratory judgment would be judged by the same standard as one seeking an
injunction only if it is "relatively certain [that] coercive litigation [in federal court] will eventually
result." Id at 376 n.l. While this view contains the same error as the Ninth Circuit viewconsidering the nature of the relief sought in deciding the jurisdictional issue-it is, as a practical
matter, indistinguishable from the "no difference" view taken in the text. Any time there is a
sufficient controversy to trigger federal jurisdiction in the first place, a trial court should be "relatively certain" that coercive litigation is soon to follow. Thus, the McCarren view would bar
relatively few suits for declaratory judgments that would be accepted if injunctive relief were
sought.
8. See infra subpart III(A).
9. See infra subpart III(B).
10. See infra subpart III(C).
11. See infra subpart III(D).
12. See infra Part IV. These two kinds of actions are grouped under one heading, since they
seem to be analytically identical. See infra note 156.

13. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
14. 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
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precludes the exercise of federal jurisdiction in suits between private
parties.' 5 This Note argues that, despite the practical and theoretical
difficulties of this rule, the principle of stare decisis favors its continued
application.
II.

Development of Federal Question Jurisdiction in FDJA Actions

A preemption claim can be raised in three ways. First, the claim
can arise as a defense to an action based on state law. 16 Second, a party
can raise a preemption claim in an action for an injunction against the
enforcement of a state law.' 7 Finally, the preemption claim can be
raised in an action for a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of
a state law. 18 Because most of the current federal jurisdiction issues
have arisen in the context of declaratory judgment actions, this Note
focuses on the FDJA. An understanding of these issues requires a discussion of the historical development of the well-pleaded complaint
rule and the doctrine of Exparte Young.
A.

"Arising Under" and the Well-Pleaded ComplaintRule

L The Early Development ofFederalQuestion Jurisdiction.-Article III of the Constitution extends the judicial power of the United
States to cases and controversies "arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority."' 9 The Supreme Court's first important construction of this language 20 appeared in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States,2 ' which is understood 22 to hold that the constitutional grant of
federal question jurisdiction extends to any case containing an "ingredient" of federal law.2 3 The Osborn case might have opened the fed15. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3562, at 413 (1975).
16. E.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917) (upholding the defendant's
claim that the New York workers' compensation statute was preempted by federal law).
17. Eg., Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (granting an injunction against a state statute
setting railroad rates).
18. E.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S.Ct. 2841 (1983)
(seeking declaration as to validity of state tax law).
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
20. The constitutional language is distinct from similar language now appearing in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1982). See infra notes 26-30 and akccompanying text.
21. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.).
22. See, e.g., J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN & J. WICKER, I MOORE's FED0.62[2.--1] (1984) [hereinafter cited as J. MOORE]; M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 54-56 (1980); 13 C. WRIGHT, A.
ERAL PRACTICE

MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 15, § 3562, at 399.
23. Chief Justice Marshall's explanation demonstrates the breadth of this construction. He
posed a hypothetical situation in which the Bank sued on a contractual claim. The only federal
issues in such a case would have been (a) whether Congress had the right to incorporate a bank
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eral courts to a flood of cases, because almost any case raising issues of
more than local interest contains an "ingredient" of federal law. For
most of the nineteenth century, however, there was no statutory grant
of general federal question jurisdiction implementing the constitutional
grant. 24 Thus, the federal courts were effectively closed to all litigants
except those whose causes of action fell within the narrow limits of
25
particular federal statutes.
In 1875, however, Congress granted to the federal courts "original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States."'26 The language of the statute, which
closely follows the language of article 111,27 suggests that Congress intended to bestow the full measure of this constitutional jurisdictional
power upon the federal courts.2 8 For better or worse, 29 however, the
30
statutory grant has been more narrowly construed.
2. The Well-PleadedComplaintRule and Mottley.-The most im-

portant limitation on the statutory grant of jurisdiction is the "wellpleaded complaint" rule. This rule was announced in Gold-Washing &
Water Co. v. Keyes, 3 1 the first Supreme Court decision to construe the
Act of 1875.32 In describing the requirement that an action "arise
under" federal law, the Court held that the federal issue "must in some
form appear upon the record, by a statement of facts, 'in legal and logiwith the right to sue in federal court, and (b) whether Congress had exercised that right. Marshall,
over a strong dissent by Justice Johnson, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 871 (Johnson, J., dissenting), maintained that federal question jurisdiction would have existed even over such a case. 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 823-24. A case with the facts of this hypothetical was decided on the same day as
Osborn. Needless to say, Marshall's "prediction" of the result was accurate. Bank of the United
States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
24. Congress had briefly granted such jurisdiction as part of the judicial legislation passed at
the end of the Adams administration. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89. The Jefferson administration quickly repealed this legislation. Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
25. Osborn falls into this category. The Court held that the statute incorporating the Bank
was intended to grant to the Bank all the power to sue that Congress could confer under the
Constitution. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 818.
26. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982)). The statute, as enacted in 1875, also required a jurisdictional amount of $500. Id This
amount was increased through the years, finally to $10,000. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85554, 72 Stat. 415. In 1980, it was abolished entirely. Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94
Stat. 2369 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
27. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 17 (4th ed. 1983).
29. Good reasons may exist for the restrictive construction of the statutory grant. See, e.g.,
id; Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal
Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 891 (1967).
30. For a recent affirmation of this proposition, see Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 103 S. Ct. 1962, 1972 (1983) (noting that "Article III 'arising under' jurisdiction is broader
than federal question jurisdiction under § 1331").
31. 96 U.S. 199 (1877).
32. See I J. MOORE, supra note 22, 0.62[2.-2]; C. WRIGHT, supra note 28, § 18, at 98 & n.2.
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cal form,' such as is required in good pleading." 33 To determine the
proper form of pleading, the practitioner was directed to Chilty on
34
Pleadings.
The well-pleaded complaint rule appears in its best-known form in
Louisville & Nashville RailroadCo. v. Mottley. 35 The Court held that a
36
federal court cannot take jurisdiction of a case as one "arising under"
federal law if the federal issue will be raised only as a defense to the
opposing party's state-law claim. 7 Thus, the plaintiffs' contract suit
did not arise under federal law, even though the only issue in controversy-whether the Hepburn Act 38 constitutionally preempted state
contract law-was a federal issue. The result in Mottley follows naturally from the well-pleaded complaint rule. Just as the gratuitous
pleading of a federal issue will not cause a case to arise under federal
law,39 neither will speculative statements of anticipated defenses aid in
40
the quest for federal jurisdiction.
33. 96 U.S. at 203.
34. Id It is not clear to what edition of Chitty's work the Court was referring. A convenient
American edition available at the time was J. CHITrY, A TREATISE ON THE PARTIES TO ACTIONS,
FORMS OF ACTIONS, AND ON PLEADING (4th Am. ed. Philadelphia 1825).

35. 211 U.S. 149 (1908). The Mottleys filed suit in federal court seeking specific performance
of a contract with the defendant railroad. The railroad had granted the Mottleys lifetime free
passes in settlement of a personal injury claim and had honored the passes for over 35 years before
the suit arose. In their complaint, the Mottleys claimed that the railroad had refused to honor the
passes because of a federal statute, the Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, § 1, 34 Stat. 584, 584 (1906) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1(7) (1976)), declaring the passes illegal. The Mottleys argued first that the Act
did not invalidate their passes, and second that if it did, it constituted an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law. The Supreme Court, raising the jurisdictional issue
on its own motion, dismissed the case without reaching the merits. 211 U.S. at 152.
36. For the remainder of this Note, the words "arising under" refer to the statutory grant.
All of the situations discussed within the Note involve sufficient "ingredients" of federal law to
come within the constitutional grant.
37. The Mottleys' constitutional claim, admittedly based on federal law, complicates the issue. Since this claim was raised as a defense to the Hepburn Act, which in turn was the railroad's
defense to the Mottleys' contract claim, rather than as an affirmative ground for complaint, it had
no place in a well-pleaded complaint. Its proper place was in a well-pleaded replication. See I J.
CHITTY, supra note 34, at 243, 565-642 (discussing the function of replications in common law
pleading).
38. Ch. 3591, § 1, 34 Stat. 584, 584 (1906) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1(7) (1976)).
39. See Joy v. City of St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332 (1906) (Peckham, J.) (holding that an action in
ejectment, seeking to recover land held under a grant from the United States, does not arise under
federal law since the alleged source of title is not a necessary element of an action in ejectment).
40. The effect of the well-pleaded complaint rule in preemption cases is complicated. Motdley presented a situation in which the plaintiff sued under state contract law and the defendant
relied on preemption as a defense. In this situation, the Court understandably treated preemption
as a defense to a state-law claim. This result is not quite so understandable in declaratory judgment actions, in which the Malley rule has been applied to bar suits presenting preemption claims
raised by plaintiffs. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Brown, 707 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir.
1983) (no jurisdiction over suits by savings and loan associations alleging preemption of state law
governing due-on-sale clauses); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 696 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.) (no jurisdiction
over suit to declare divorce decree unenforceable in light of conflicting federal law), cert. denied,
104 S.Ct. 337 (1983); Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Esprit De Corp., 682 F.2d 1267, 1274 (9th Cir. 1982)
(no jurisdiction over suit alleging preemption of state antitrust law); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
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B.

The FederalDeclaratoryJudgment Act

In 1934, Congress passed the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act,'
which authorized the federal courts to issue declaratory judgments in
cases "of actual controversy. ' 42 The language of the statute indicates
that Congress intended for federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over
controversies without regard for technical common-law rules that previously would have barred judicial cognizance of the claim: "[Any
court of the United States. . . may declare the rights and legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought."43
The courts have interpreted this language to justify abandoning
rules of pleading in determining when and by whom controversies can
be brought in federal court. An insurance company, for example,
could sue to declare a policy invalid before the insured sued on the
policy.44 Similarly, an alleged patent infringer was not forced to hold
his affairs in abeyance awaiting a suit by the patent holder, but could
sue immediately for a declaration that the patent was invalid. 45
The courts also might have found that the FDJA abolished the use
of pleading rules in determining which controversies could be brought
in federal court. 46 Under this interpretation, the Mottley well-pleaded
v. Anderson, 681 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1982) (no jurisdiction over suits by savings and loan associations alleging preemption of state laws governing due-on-sale clauses).
These cases should be compared with the line of cases beginning with Smith v. Kansas City
Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). Under the rule established by that case, a suit might arise
under federal law if "vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841,
2846 (1983). The Court in FranchiseTax Board approved this line of cases and rejected the rule
that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action," established by Justice Holmes
in American Well Works v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). 103 S. Ct. at 2846; see
infra note 151. While the Kansas City Title & Trust Co. doctrine has rarely been applied, at least
one recent case has applied it to assert jurisdiction over a preemption claim raised by the plaintiff
in a contract suit. Noble v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 83-1218-MA (D. Mass. Dec. 28, 1983)
(claiming that defendant had withheld money from plaintiff's paycheck in violation of the Internal Revenue Code).
41. Ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982)).
42. Id Article III defines the federal judicial power in terms of "cases" and "controversies."
The Court has noted that the FDJA "manifestly has regard to" article III. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982) (emphasis added).
44. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
45. E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir.) ("It is of no
moment ... that the suit is brought by the alleged infringer instead of by the owner."), cert.
denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937). The Edelmann case has recently taken on increased significance. See
infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
46. The words of the statute---"whether or not further relief.., could be sought"---could
reasonably support an interpretation that allowed federal courts to take jurisdiction over any dispute that raised federal issues. The syllogism would be as follows: Before the FDJA, there were
many cases over which federal jurisdiction did not exist because of rules of pleading that limited
the types of issues that federal courts could consider in any particular case; the FDJA eliminated
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complaint rule would not apply in FDJA actions. Courts would ignore
the rules of pleading and exercise federal jurisdiction over any FDJA
action requiring determination of an issue of federal law, regardless of
which party raised the issue. The only two limitations on federal question jurisdiction would then be the requirement of "actual controversy" 47 and the Osborn requirement 48 that such cases involve at least
an "ingredient" of federal law.
In Skely Oil Co. v. PhillipsPetroleum Co. ,49 however, the Court,
focusing on the "current of jurisdictional legislation since the Act of
March 3, 1875," 50 held that the effect of the FDJA was procedural
only.5 1 Thus, Skel Oil requires courts in FDJA actions to look to
underlying jurisdictional law, including the well-pleaded complaint
rule as defined in Mottley. 52 As a result, a federal court can exercise
jurisdiction over an FDJA action only if it could do so in the absence of
53
the FDJA.
Applying the Skely Oil rule to the facts of Mottley 5 4-a contract
dispute between private parties-illustrates the rule's effect in FDJA
actions. Absent the FDJA, the only coercive action 55 that could have
presented this controversy would have been the action brought in the

these requirements by directing the court to decide the case without reference to the availability of
any relief within the federal court's jurisdiction; thus, the federal court now has jurisdiction without regard to these rules, including the well-pleaded complaint rule.
47. See supra text accompanying note 42. In addition, the Constitution limits the jurisdiction
of federal courts to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
48. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
49. 339 U.S. 667 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.).
50. Id. at 673. Justice Frankfurter was referring primarily to the Act of March 3, 1887, ch.
373, 24 Stat. 522, which had been interpreted by the Court in Tennessee v. Union & Planters'
Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894), to bar removal to federal court of suits in which the only federal issue
was a defense.
51. 339 U.S. at 671-72 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937)).
52. Although Skelly Oil made it clear that the well-pleaded complaint rule was merged into
the jurisdictional law applicable in FDJA actions, this result is somewhat anomalous. The wellpleaded complaint rule was fashioned to deal only with coercive actions and was uniquely suited
to the nineteenth century style of pleading. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. The
rule is difficult to apply to the modem FDJA action for two reasons. First, after the merger of law
and equity, most pleading distinctions have lost practical relevance. It is difficult to justify resurrection of these rules for use by a generation of lawyers untrained in their arcane technicalities.
See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 28, § 18, at 101-02. Second, by its very nature, the declaratory
judgment is available to either party involved in a controversy. When either party can bring suit,
it is senseless to adopt formalistic rules that, without regard to the case under consideration, label
one party "plaintiff' and the other "defendant."
53. Some courts have construed the FDJA still more narrowly, refusing to hear some FDJA
actions that would be cognizable in federal court if further relief were sought. See supra note 7.
54. See supra note 35.
55. A coercive action is an action seeking any relief other than a declaratory judgment. See
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1983).
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Mottley case itself,56 in which the well-pleaded complaint rule barred
federal question jurisdiction. If the railroad company had brought suit
in federal court for a declaration that the Mottleys' pass was invalid,
the court would not have been able to hear the case. Thus, under the
rule of Skely Oil an FDJA suit might not "arise under" federal law
even though the claimant relies exclusively on federal law.
C Exparte Young andPreemption Cases
Under Exparte Young, 57 federal courts have equitable jurisdiction
to enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional statutes.5 8 The
effect of Exparte Young on the eleventh amendment has received ample attention 59 and will not be discussed here. For the purposes of this
Note, another point is important-the decision's implications for the
well-pleaded complaint rule.60 To bring Exparte Young into line with
the rule, one must assume that the preemption claim in that case actually appeared in proper form on the face of the complaint.
If this assumption is correct, then one can harmonize Ex parte
Young and Mottley by classifying the preemption claim in the former
as "offensive" and that in the latter as "defensive."' 6' The plaintiff in
Exparte Young relied on a federal right, while the plaintiff in Mottley
merely anticipated a federal defense. 62 This simple distinction becomes
56. Neither party could have sued for an injunction because there was no "irreparable injury." See 3 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1338 (1st ed. 1887).
57. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (Peckham, J.) (allowing federal jurisdiction, despite the eleventh
amendment, in an action for an injunction against the Attorney General of Minnesota to restrain
enforcement of state railroad rates).
58. This leaves aside the difficulties in application raised by such statutes as the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982), the Tax Injunction Act, id. § 1341, and the Three-Judge Court
Act, id. § 2284.
59. See, e.g., IJ. MOORE, supra note 22,
0.6012.-2], 0.6512.-1]; M. REDISH, supra note
22, at 152-59; 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 15, §§ 423 1-4233.
60. The Court's treatment of the jurisdictional issue consisted of a reference to Osborn followed by the assertion that the case "does not extend, in truth, the jurisdiction of the courts over
the subject matter." 209 U.S. at 167. The Court's discussion of Osborn served only to establish
that the case was within the constitutionalgrant of jurisdiction, which was not the difficult problem, because any "ingredient" of federal law will cause a case to arise under federal law for
purposes of the Constitution. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. It is not, however,
immediately clear that the preemption claims in Exparte Young, which were raised as a defense to
a threatened state action, properly appeared on the face of the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint.
61. Thus, the line of cases followingExparte Young presents a series of offensive preemption
claims. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983). The line of cases following
Mottley and rejecting jurisdiction presents "defensive" preemption claims. See, e.g., Skelly Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
62. This labeling of the parties in preemption cases leads to a general characterization, with
the conspicuous exception of Ex parte Young's progeny, of preemption claims raised in FDJA
actions as defensive. Although the FDJA provides a procedural remedy whereby preemption is
easily raised by a plaintiff, the effect of Skelly Oil has been to prevent such cases from being heard
in federal court. See cases cited supra note 40.
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complicated when applied in FDJA actions, however, because under
Skelly Oil the federal court will not have jurisdiction if the preemption
claim is classified as defensive.6 3 The problem arises in determining
which claims are defensive, since the labels "plaintiff' and "defendant"
64
are not as helpful in an FDJA action as they are in a coercive action.
The courts have generally classified FDJA plaintiffs' claims of preemption as defensive when the defendant is a private party65 and as offen66
sive when the defendant is a state.
III.

Preemption Cases Between a State and a Private Party

The most obvious setting for a preemption dispute is a lawsuit between a private party and a state. Such a suit could arise in four situations. First, a private party could sue a state for a declaration of
preemption. Second, a state could sue a private party for a declaration
of nonpreemption. Third, a state could sue a private party for a declaration of preemption. Finally, a state could raise a defense of preemption against an action by a private party.
A.

Action by a Private PartyAgainst a Statefor a Declarationof
Preemption

The first type of preemption case, an action by a private party
against a state for a declaration'of preemption, is the most obvious fact
pattern. This type of case is analogous to Exparte Young: the private
party is seeking to assert a constitutional or statutory claim against the
state. In theory, these cases should be treated as offensive preemption
cases over which a federal court may properly exercise jurisdiction.
The courts, however, have not always reached that result.
In Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co. ,67 a company sought a
declaratory judgment that a Utah regulatory commission could not
constitutionally interfere with commerce traveling along routes approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Court held that
it lacked jurisdiction because the dispute had not yet ripened into an
"actual controversy. ' 68 Had there been an actual controversy, the
plaintiff could have brought an Exparte Young-type action in federal
63. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 52.
65. See cases cited supra note 40 and accompanying text. Even the Court admits that it is
difficult to justify this result other than for "reasons involving perhaps more history than logic."
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1983).
66. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
67. 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
68. Id. at 241-48; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
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court for an injunction against the state.6 9 The Court suggested, however, that even if there had been an actual controversy, and even
though it would have had jurisdiction over an action for an injunction,70 it would not have had jurisdiction over the FDJA action. The
Court stated:
Where the complaint in an action for declaratory judgment seeks
in essence to assert a defense to an impending or threatened state
court action, it is the character of the threatened action, and not
of the defense, which will determine whether there is federalquestion jurisdiction in the District Court. If the cause of action,
which the declaratory defendant threatens to assert, does not itself involve a claim under federal law, it is doubtful if a federal
court may entertain an action for a declaratory judgment establishing a defense to that claim. This is dubious even though the
declaratory complaint sets forth a claim of federal right, if that
right is in7reality in the nature of a defense to a threatened cause
of action. l
The Court, apparently thinking of Mottley, thus characterized the
preemption claim in Wycoff as defensive, although the case was factually much like Ex parte Young because the plaintiff rather than the
defendant was relying on federal law.
Some courts interpreted the Wycoff dictum as an authoritative
statement that a preemption claim alone would not suffice to cause an
FDJA suit to arise under federal law.7 2 This conclusion assumes that
Exparte Young jurisdiction is not available even over offensive preemption claims under the FDJA. 73 Other courts, however, refused to
follow the Wycoff dictum and instead expanded the Ex parte Young
doctrine to include actions against a state for declaratory judgments of
preemption. 74 These courts have added Exparte Young to the body of
underlying federal law that establishes the jurisdictional limits of the
69. Just as in Ex parte Young, a state official would have been attempting to enforce an
unconstitutional statute against a private party. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
70. The Court did not discuss the possibility of injunctive relief. There is, however, little
doubt that if there had been an actual controversy, Exparle Young would have applied to these
facts. See supra note 69.
71. 344 U.S. at 248.
72. See, e.g., Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Insurance Dep't, 571 F.2d 423, 427 (8th Cir.
1978); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 465 F.2d 237, 241 (3d Cir.
1972).
73. Judge Posner, realizing this, has noted that the Wycoff "dictum, read broadly, would
overrule Exparte Young and every case that has ever followed it. If not wrong, such a reading
would still be an inappropriate flight of fancy for an inferior federal court to take." Illinois v.
General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 211 (7th Cir. 1982).
74. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323, 327 (2d Cir. 1982) (suit alleging
preemption by ERISA), afjdmem. sub nom. Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 103 S. Ct.
3564 (1983); Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982) (suit alleging that state
statute violated commerce clause).
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FDJA, accepting jurisdiction over suits brought by private parties
against states for both declaratory judgments and injunctions.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Steffel v. Thompson 75
provides the most detailed justification for this rejection of Wycoff. In
his view, the FDJA was a response to Exparte Young, which had introduced a serious, although arguably necessary, disturbance into the federal system. 76 The FDJA helped to calm the disturbance by providing
for a more respectful treatment of state sovereignty. While Justice
Brennan's reading of the legislative history is open to question, 77 he
identified an important concern of federalism. 78 The FDJA stabilizes
the federal system by enabling the federal judiciary to pass on the constitutionality of state laws without issuing direct commands to state officials. A declaratory judgment is much less harmful to the state
official's public image than an injunction, but still protects the private
citizen's federal rights. In order to maximize the FDJA's stabilizing
effect, Justice Brennan argued, federal courts must have jurisdiction
over those FDJA actions in which the plaintiff could have sought redress through an Exparte Young-type action for an injunction. 79
A second reason to reject the Wycoff dictum is its inconsistency
with the language of the FDJA. The statute expressly makes the jurisdictional question independent of the relief sought.8 0 If the federal
court would have jurisdiction over the controversy in a suit for an injunction, it should also have jurisdiction over a suit seeking only a declaratory judgment.8 1 It is hardly sensible to hold that a federal court
has jurisdiction to grant the less intrusive remedy only when the plaintiff adds a count seeking the more intrusive remedy.
Although various commentators noted the inconsistency between
Wycoff and Exparte Young, 8 2 the Supreme Court did not address the
75. 415 U.S. 452 (1974). The main issue in Steffel was the applicability of "Our Federalism,"
see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1970), in situations in which prosecutions are threatened,
but not yet pending.
76. 415 U.S. at 465-66.
77. The legislative history relied on by Justice Brennan shows concern for the individual
forced to risk criminal punishment in order to test the constitutionality of the statute. It does not,
however, speak to the allocation of judicial power between state and federal courts. S. REP. No.
1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1264, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
78. Concerns of federalism should carry great weight in preemption cases, in which a federal
judge is asked to nullify a state law. In such situations, the federal system benefits from "less
intrusive" remedies. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 469. This portion of the opinion refers the reader to a
lengthy exegesis on the topic in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111-15 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. 415 U.S. at 471.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982) ("[A]ny court. . . may declare the rights. . . of any. . . party
. . . whether or not further relief is or could be sought.").
81. See supra note 7.
82. See Note, Federal Jurisdiction over Declaratory Suits Challenging State Action, 79
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issue until 1983, when it decided Shaw v. DeltaAir Lines, Inc. 83 Justice
Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that "[i]t is beyond
dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to enjoin state
officials from interfering with federal rights. 8 4 Justice Blackmun emphasized that the suit in Shaw was an offensive preemption claim, not-

ing that the plaintiffs sought "injunctions against enforcement of state
laws they claim are preempted. '8 5 Although Justice Blackmun did not
specifically discuss declaratory judgments, the analysis in Shaw is contrary to the Wycoff dictum because it focuses on the offensive or defensive nature of the preemption claim rather than the nature of the
hypothetical coercive action upon which the declaratory judgment ac-

tion is based.

6

Unless a distinction is drawn between an action for an

injunction and an action for a declaratory judgment,8 7 a federal court
should have jurisdiction over an FDJA suit in which a private party
asserts an offensive preemption claim against a state.
B.

Action by a State Against a Private Partyfora Declarationof
Nonpreemption.

The second type of preemption case, an action by a state against a
private party for a declaration of nonpreemption, presents an entirely
different situation. The plaintiff is a state seeking to ensure the validity
of its laws, rather than a private party seeking to vindicate federal
rights. Because the plaintiff is a state and the claim is defensive in
nature, Ex parte Young is inapplicable. Indeed, the Skely Oil rule88
COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1979); Note, The ExpandedFederalQuestion: On the "Independent Viability"
of Declaratory Claims, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 809 (1982); United Airlines, Inc. v. Division of
Indus. Safety, 454 U.S. 944, 949 (1983) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (recognizing a conflict in the circuits on the availability of original federal jurisdiction in preemption cases);
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Illinois, 103 S. Ct. 469, 470-71 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (recognizing a conflict in the circuits on the availability of federal jurisdiction
in preemption cases).
83. 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983).
84. Id at 2899 n.14 (citing Exparte Young).
85. Id. (emphasis in original).
86. In another case decided on the same day as Shaw, Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2850 n.14 (1983), the Court cited Wycoff without disapproval. That statement was dictum, however, and Justice Blackmun distinguished Franchise Tax
Board from Shaw as a case that involved a claim that a state law was not preempted. 103 S. Ct. at
2899 n.14. In any event, Franchise Tax Board is distinguishable from Shaw. See infra note 102.
But see Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 723 F.2d 1173, 1180 (5th Cir. 1984) (approving the Wycoff
dictum even after Shaw and Franchise Tax Board).
87. See supra note 7. It is unlikely that a distinction will be drawn between an action for an
injunction and an action for a declaratory judgment. See, e.g., Board of Elec. Light Comm'rs v.
McCarren, 563 F. Supp. 374, 376 n.l (D. Vt. 1982), afd, 725 F. 2d 176 (2d Cir. 1983). But see
Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding no
jurisdiction in a suit for a declaration of preemption against a state official).
88. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
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could have been applied to deny jurisdiction in these cases because the
claim would not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. Instead, the courts have employed a more complex analysis.
89
Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,
"the most important decision on the scope of federal-question jurisdiction in at least a quarter century," 90 considered jurisdiction over an

action by a state against a private party for a declaration of nonpreemption after the suit was removed to federal court. In a suit by the
State of California for a declaration that its tax levy on the defendant
trust was not preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA),9 t the Court refused to find the Skelly Oil well-pleaded
complaint rule controlling, even though the preemption issue could
arise only as a defense to a claim for taxes by California. 92 Citing the
Seventh Circuit decision in . Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty
Co. ?3 Justice Brennan noted: "[Flederal courts have regularly taken
original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment suits in which, if the
declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive action to enforce its
rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal question. 9 4 ERISA gave Construction Laborers Vacation Trust a right to sue. 95 Because a coercive action by one party would have arisen under federal
law, application of the Edelmann rule would appear to produce a hold96
ing that jurisdiction was proper.
89. 103 S. Ct. 2841 (1983).
90. C. MCCORMICK, J.

CHADBOURN & C. WRIGHT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL

COURTS iii (7th ed. Supp. 1983).

91. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); see
supra notes 2, 6.
92. 103 S. Ct. at 2852. For discussion of Skelly Oil, see supra notes 49-5 6 and accompanying
text.
93. 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937). The court in Edelmann allowed
an alleged patent infringer to seek a declaratory judgment as to the scope and validity of the
patent. The rationale, as adopted in FranchiseTax Board, is that in a hypothetical coercive action
by the patent holder, the federal question would appear on the face of the complaint. This is
enough to satisfy the spirit of the well-pleaded complaint rule, even in an action brought by the
patent infringer, who does not rely on federal law.
94. 103 S.Ct. at 2851.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1982). Whether that right could have been exercised in this case
is doubtful. It seems likely that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), would have
barred a suit under the FDJA. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982)
(O'Connor, J.) (upholding application of Tax Injunction Act to FDJA actions). As to the rights of
a party not specifically granted a right to sue by ERISA, one court has looked to whether the
party's "interests were considered and protected by Congress when ERISA was enacted." If so,
the party has standing to raise ERISA in a preemption suit under the jurisdictional rule of Ex
parte Young. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323, 326 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'dmem.
sub nom. Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 103 S. Ct. 3564 (1983).
96. The Tax Injunction Act clouds the application ofEdelmann. See supra note 95. It is an
open question whether a cause of action barred by the Tax Injunction Act is a sufficient basis
under the Edelmann doctrine to grant "arising under" jurisdiction to a suit by the opposing party.
Although this Note assumes that jurisdiction would be proper, that assumption is open to ques-
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But just as he chose not to apply Skelly Oil, Justice Brennan did
not base his conclusion on Edelmann. Putting aside these readily available compasses, 97 he forged instead into uncharted waters. Citing Justice Cardozo's mystical9 8 opinion in Gully v. First National Bank,99
Justice Brennan set his course by the federalism concerns that he found
implicit in the holdings of Gully and Skelly Oil:100 "[C]onsiderations of
comity make us reluctant to snatch cases which a State has brought
from the courts of that State, unless some clear rule demands it."101 In
light of these considerations, Justice Brennan found that the case did
02
not arise under federal law.
tion. Analysis of the FranchiseTax Board facts reveals the true complexity of the situation. California filed suit in state court; it did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the federal court.
The Tax Injunction Act reflects a concrete congressional judgment that a state should not be
forced to justify its tax policies to federal judges. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v.
Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 298 (1943). This policy should be applicable whether the defendant in the
tax suit seeks an injunction in a separate action or attempts to remove the action to federal court.
97. The metaphor is Justice Cardozo's:
Instead, there has been a selective process which picks the substantial causes out of the
web and lays the other ones aside. As in problems of causation, so here in the search for
the underlying law. If we follow the ascent far enough, countless claims of right can be
discovered to have their source or their operative limits in the provisions of a federal
statute or in the Constitution itself with its circumambient restrictions upon legislative
power. To set bounds to the pursuit, the courts have formulated the distinction between
controversies that are basic and those that are collateral, between disputes that are necessary and those that are merely possible. We shall be lost in a maze if we put that compass by.
Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 118 (1936).
98. "Cardozo's opinion lapses into an opaque mysticism which . . . is as impenetrable as
when the opinion was written." Cohen, supra note 29, at 905.
99. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
100. Franchise Tax Board, 103 S.Ct. at 2853.
101. Id at 2852 n.22. This statement is somewhat confusing; Justice Brennan had earlier
noted that the test for determining whether the district court can accept removal of such a case is
whether the court could have exercised jurisdiction over it as an original action. Id. at 2851 n.18.
Yet his emphasis on the fact that the state in FranchiseTax Board brought the action in state court
suggests that the result might have been different if the state had filed its original action in federal
court. Justice Brennan did not resolve this apparent inconsistency.
In an earlier dissenting opinion in Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (holding that
Younger abstention was proper in a suit challenging an attachment proceeding because the state
was a party to such a proceeding), Justice Brennan expressed a different view:
The Court relies on the State's fortuitous presence as a plaintiff. . . . The Court's reliance on the presence of the State here may suggest that it might view differently an
attachment under the same Act at the instance of a private party, but no reason is advanced why the State as plaintiff should enjoy such an advantage in its own courts over
the ordinary citizen plaintiff. Under any analysis, it seems to me that this solicitousness
for the State] . . .is hardly compelled by the great principles of federalism, comity and
mutual respect between federal and state courts . ...
Id at 455 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. FranchiseTax Board and Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 2890 (1983), see supra
notes 83-86, were decided on the same day, but reached seemingly contradictory results. In
Franchise Tax Board, the Court found a lack of federal jurisdiction in a suit by a state against
private parties for a declaration of nonpreemption. In Shaw, the Court found jurisdiction in a suit
by private parties against a state for a declaration of preemption. There are two possible distinctions between the cases.
One approach would treat the claim in Shaw as the assertion of a preemption claim by the
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Though the mode of analysis in FranchiseTax Board raised interesting questions, the outcome was not unusual. Lower courts had occasionally reached identical results 0 3 through a straightforward
application of Skelly Oil; the preemption claim represented only a defensive federal issue, which the lower courts found insufficient to create
federal question jurisdiction. 10 4 These courts rarely applied the
Edelmann rule. 0 5 FranchiseTax Board confirms these lower court results-an action filed by a state cannot be removed to federal court
because of a defense of preemption-while applying a more sophisticated analysis.

plaintiff and the claim in FranchiseTax Board as the assertion of a federal claim by the defendant. This distinction ignores the Edelmann rule, which was cited by the Court in Franchise Tax
Board. 103 S. Ct. at 2851 n.19. IfEdelmann applies to a preemption case, it is irrelevant which
party is asserting the preemption claim; all that matters is that one of the parties can assert a
federal claim.
A more logical approach would view Franchise Tax Board as an exception to the Edelmann
rule: a state plaintiffcannot be forced into federal court on the basis of the Edelmann rule because
of "considerations of comity." Thus, the Edelmann rule would apply to Shaw, in which the state
was the defendant, but would have no effect in FranchiseTax Board, in which the state was the
plaintiff.
The difference between these two approaches can be illustrated by considering a state-law
action against a state agency that asserts a preemption defense. If the first approach is applied, the
suit could not be brought in federal court because the plaintiff is not asserting a federal claim. If
the second approach is applied, the suit could be brought in federal court because the state agency
is not the plaintiff.
103. See, e.g., Illinois v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 704 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.);
Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (remanding the action
brought by the state, but upholding jurisdiction over the previously filed FDJA action by the
individual). Judge Posner has recently expressed his views on federal jurisdiction at some length.
Posner, Towardan Economic Theory of FederalJurisdiction,6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 41 (1983).
104. The state usually will not plead the allegedly preemptive federal statute in its complaint.
See, e.g., Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 208 (7th Cir. 1982). After all, the state does
not want to be in federal court litigating the constitutionality of its laws; it wants to enforce those
laws. Lower courts have had little difficulty remanding actions to state courts in cases in which
the enforcement action complaint failed to mention the federal statute on its face, even though
federal question jurisdiction clearly would have existed over the controversy in a suit brought by a
private party. See, e.g., id.; cf Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d 29,
34 (3d Cir. 1981) (dismissing a suit between private parties, but reserving the question of probable
result had the plaintiff mentioned the federal law on the face of its complaint). FranchiseTax
Board was unusual because the state joined a claim for a declaratory judgment to its enforcement
action, mentioning the allegedly preemptive federal statute.
105. Some courts at least recognized the Edelmann rule in differing fact situations. In Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1983), the state of Wisconsin sought a declaration that an
Indian tribe had no federal right to restrict access to navigable waters. The court, citing
Edelmann, upheld federal jurisdiction, stating that it saw "no jurisdictional basis for distinguishing a declaratory suit by an alleged patent infringer from the case at bar." Id at 1329. In Serio v.
Liss, 300 F.2d 386, 389 n.4 (3d Cir. 1961), a labor union's business agent sought a declaration that
the Landrum-Griffm Act, 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1982), gave him the right to continue in office. The
court, in upholding federal jurisdiction, treated Edelmann as an exception to the narrowly construed Gully requirement that a federal right be an essential element of plaintiffs cause of action.
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C. Action by a State Against a PrivatePartyfor a Declaration of
Preemption
The third type of preemption case, an action by a state for a declaration that federal law preempts state law, presents the converse of
FranchiseTax Board- the state, rather than the private party, relies on
preemption. Although cases of this type are unusual, they have
arisen. 06 Comparing this type of case to the FranchiseTax Board situation illuminates the factors that a court should consider in deciding
whether federal question jurisdiction is appropriate in preemption
cases of this type.
The most important distinction between preemption claims against
a state and preemption claims by a state is that the considerations of
comity that led the Court to refuse jurisdiction in FranchiseTax Board
are not present in the latter. When a state files suit in federal court
seeking a declaration of preemption, there is every reason for the court
to accept jurisdiction. Federal law is the basis of the plaintiffs complaint, just as it is in Exparte Young-type cases, in which federal jurisdiction exists.'0 7 Moreover, the state has voluntarily submitted itself to
the federal judicial power. Thus, principles of comity should not bar
jurisdiction when the state brings itself into federal court.
The result should not be different if the state has filed suit in its
own courts and the defendant seeks to remove to federal court. The
state, relying on federal law to preempt its own law, should not be allowed to object to federal jurisdiction. In these cases, the state is not
forced to defend its local law before an intrusive federal tribunal,
which was the concern of the Court in Franchise Tax Board.0 8 Instead, the state will learn from the federal court's definitive interpretation of the federal law the exact boundaries within which its own rules
are valid. In addition, the federal law will receive uniform interpretation. No cogent argument against federal jurisdiction is present, therefore, when a private party seeks to remove to federal court a
preemption suit brought by a state.'0 9
106. Eg., City of Saginaw v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 446-M, 720 F.2d 459 (6th
Cir. 1983) (suit by municipality for declaration that the Comprehensive Employment Training
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-992 (1982), preempted various clauses of a collective bargaining
agreement).
107. See supra subpart II(C).
108. See supra notes 95-96, 100-01 and accompanying text.
109. If the suit is one over which federal courts would have original jurisdiction, it is also one
over which they have removal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982). Therefore, the jurisdictional
result in suits filed in state courts and removed to federal courts follows necessarily from the result
in those originally filed in federal courts.
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D. Action by a Private PartyAgainst a State in Which the State
Raises a Defense of Preemption
In the fourth type of preemption case, a private citizen goes to
court seeking redress against the state government, only to find that the
state claims that its own law is preempted by federal law. As pointed
out above, 10 the state has no cogent objection to federal jurisdiction.
Yet these cases differ from the third type' in two important ways.
First, the plaintiff does not rely on federal law. Indeed, the preemption claim raised by the state might easily be classified as defen113
sive. 2 The well-pleaded complaint rule of Mottley and Skely Oil
argues strongly against finding jurisdiction in such a situation. On the
other hand, the Edelmann rule states that whenever the defendant's suit
would arise under federal law, as is true in this case, the bar of the wellpleaded complaint rule may be avoided.14
Second, the private citizen who initiates a lawsuit in state court
may argue that Franchise Tax Board should be extended to protect a
private party's right to a resolution of his claim in state court. 1 5 But
Franchise Tax Board should not control such a case. The relationship
between a state and the federal government is much more sensitive
than that between a private party and the federal government. 16 The
lingering attributes of state sovereignty that make federal courts so cog110. See supra subpart III(C).
11. The cases discussed in subpart III(C) presented the same controversy in the opposite
procedural context-the state filed suit first in those cases.
112. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 31-40, 49-53 and accompanying text.
114. Of course, Edelmann presented an entirely different factual setting: the plaintiff attempted to bring a declaratory judgment action in federal court on the basis of the defendant's
ability to bring a coercive action under federal law. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
In this fourth type of case, however, the plaintiff attempts to establish federal jurisdiction on the
basis of the defendant's ability to bring a declaratory judgment action under federal law. This
difference does not affect the jurisdictional result. Under Skelly Oil, the jurisdictional boundaries
for coercive actions and for declaratory judgment actions are coextensive. See supra notes 7, 4953 and accompanying text. Thus, it is immaterial that the plaintiff is seeking to establish jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant's ability to bring a declaratory judgment action rather than a
coercive action. Moreover, because Justice Brennan's opinion in FranchiseTax Board indicates
that Edeimann is not limited to its facts, 103 S. Ct. 2851 n. 19, Edelmann should not be interpreted
narrowly.
On the other hand, Franchise Tax Board demonstrates that the Edeimann rule is not allinclusive. Considerations of comity limit its reach. Compare FranchiseTax Board (no jurisdiction
over a suit by a state for a declaration of nonpreemption), with Exparle Young (jurisdiction over a
suit against a state for an injunction based on preemption). These suits presented the same type of
controversy, but only the suit initiated by the private party was found to arise under federal law.
115. FranchiseTax Board barred removal by a private defendant of a state's tax levy brought
in state court. See supra subpart III(B).
116. This is reflected in the Court's recent trend toward abstention in a great variety of cases
involving various aspects of state sovereignty. For a brief treatment of these various abstention
doctrines, see C. WRIGHT, supra note 28, §§ 52-52A.
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nizant of comity with the state judicial systems do not protect a private
citizen from the federal judicial power. 7 The citizen has no compelling
argument against federal jurisdiction.1
Thus, the federal system's interest in uniform interpretation of its
laws, as manifested in the Edelmann rule," 8 might favor federal jurisdiction in these cases; the Franchise Tax Board "considerations of comity"' 119 are not present.
IV. Preemption Cases Between Private Parties
The fmal type of preemption case, a suit for declaration of preemption or nonpreemption by one private party against another private
party, raises different issues than the types discussed in Part III. Because no state is involved, considerations of comity do not arise. Instead, these cases are governed by traditional jurisdictional principles,
including the well-pleaded complaint rule. Under Skelly Oil, the private party plaintiffs assertion of preemption is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction; the test is whether either party could have brought an
action arising under federal law.' 20 Although this holding22has inspired
widespread criticism,' 2' it has retained its basic vitality.'
Two recent developments in the construction of the "arising
under" language, however, may signal a major change in the Skely Oil
rule. First, the Court's recent application of the Exparte Young doctrine to FDJA actions between a private party and a state' 23 may provide a means of undercutting Skely Oil in actions between private
parties. The implicit characterization of the preemption claim as offensive' 24 in Shaw v. DeltaAir Lines, Inc. 125 casts doubt upon the continu117. This is a rather ironic application of FranchiseTax Board That decision used considerations of comity and federalism to restrict federal original jurisdiction. This application uses those
same policies to accept federal jurisdiction. Such an approach might be questionable in light of
the general conception of federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction. Because this is an area in
which the federal courts have not yet defined a result, however, such considerations should be
applied to settle the difficult question.
118. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
121. In Franchise Tax Board, Justice Brennan recognized that the weight of authority disapproves of the widespread application of Skely Oil. 103 S. Ct. at 2851 n.17. See, e.g., AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN

STATE AND FEDERAL

COURTS § 1311, at 170-71 (1969); C. WRIGHT, supra note 28, § 18, at 101-02; Cohen, supra note

29, at 894 n.26; Mishkin, The Federal"Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157,
184 (1953).
122. See FranchiseTax Board, 103 S. Ct. at 2851 n.17 ("At this point, any adjustments in the
system that has evolved under the Skely Oil rule must come from Congress.").
123. See supra subpart III(A).
124. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
125. 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2899 n.14 (1983).
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ing validity of the Motley characterization of preemption claims as
defensive in all suits between private parties. 26 Second, the mode of
analysis in Franchise Tax Board may signal a change in the Court's
perception of the purpose of the "arising under" requirement in determining the bounds of federal question jurisdiction.
A. Application of Ex parte Young to Action Between Private Parties
for a DeclaratoryJudgment of Preemption or Nonpreemption
The problem Justice Peckham faced in Exparte Young was simple
enough: the eleventh amendment bars suits against states.12 7 Peckham
had to explain how, despite this express prohibition, suits could lie
against a state attorney general to enjoin enforcement of a state statute.
His explanation was beguilingly lucid: "If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer. . . is in that case stripped of his official. . . character
and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct."' 2 81 This conclusion seems to have been based on the
supremacy clause.' 2 9 Any act by an official that violates the Constitution cannot be deemed to be an act of a state; only weighty and convincing proof could convince a court that a state had purposefully
acted in a way barred by the supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The unconstitutional action must be attributed to the individual,
30
stripped of the mantle of state authority.
The reasoning in Ex parte Young is peculiarly applicable to private preemption cases. Having found the defendant in Exparte Young
to be merely a private citizen, the Court had no qualms about making
the suit cognizable by a federal court of original jurisdiction. Yet federal courts have refused to accept jurisdiction in similar cases in which
the defendant was private in fact rather than in fiction. '3' The three
principal arguments in support of this limitation are examined below.
1. Exparte Young JurisdictionIs Necessary Only in Suits Against
States.-In support of the limitation of Exparte Young-type jurisdiction to cases against states, one might argue that an injunction against
the enforcement of a preempted law should be available only in suits
126. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
128. 209 U.S. at 159-60.
129. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
130. "[T]he use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of
complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the State in
its sovereign or governmental capacity." 209 U.S. at 159.
131. See cases cited supra note 40.
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against states. Only a state, the argument goes, poses enough of a
threat to private rights to warrant such a drastic remedy. If any concern for federalism justifies Ex parte Young, it is the fear that state
courts will unduly favor state law and not pay due respect to federal
law.' 32 This fear is particularly acute when the state is a party. In the
nineteenth century, this was certainly a valid concern. Because of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, most states would not have been subject to suit in their own courts.' 33 Thus, the federal court was the only
available forum. While sovereign immunity has a much narrower
reach now than it once had, 34 states still enjoy a considerable advantage in their own courts.' 35 The presence of a state on one side of a
case, coupled with any local prejudice against federal law, might alter
the balance further to the disfavor of the federal claimant. But powerful private parties can invade the federal rights implicated in preemption cases just as harmfully and irreparably 36 as any state.137 A
private party in some cases will enter the courtroom wielding financial,
political, or even intellectual power equal to or greater than that of the
state. 138 The party claiming preemption in such a case is just as much
in need of a federal forum as was the plaintiff in Exparte Young.
2. The FourteenthAmendment as the BasisforExparte Young.Justice Peckham could have based his opinion in Exparte Young on
the theory that the fourteenth amendment constituted a pro tanto repeal of the eleventh amendment. 39 Suits against states alleging violations of the fourteenth amendment would then be within the federal
judicial power despite the eleventh amendment. Peckham rejected this
argument in Exparte Young, however, preferring instead a resolution
132. In Exparte Young itself, the plaintiff claimed that the statute had been drafted with high
penalties in order to make it extremely risky to test the law in the state courts. 209 U.S. at 144-45.
133. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 131-132 (4th ed. 1971).
134. Id
135. See cases cited supra note 6.
136. One of the basic elements of an action seeking injunctive relief is an injury irreparable by

legal remedy. See 3 J. POMEROY, supra note 56, § 1338 (noting that injunctive relief is confined to
"those cases in which the legal remedy is not full and adequate"). In Exparte Young, the legal
remedy was inadequate because, as a practical matter, it prevented the courts from ruling on the
constitutionality of the statute. See supra note 132.

137. One can easily imagine a company town in which the company pays a significant portion
of the entire tax payments of the community. The company would enter the courtroom with
immense political power, coupled with representation more effective than that available to most
government entities. Such a party could have just as much of an overawing influence upon the
trial court as a state.
138. See supra note 137.

139. Since the fourteenth amendment was ratified later than the eleventh, it could logically be
construed to overrule the eleventh whenever the two amendments are inconsistent. See C.
WRIGHT, supra note 28, § 48, at 289; Note, Sovereign Immunity in Suits to Enjoin the Enforcement
of UnconstitutionalLegislation, 50 HARV. L. REV. 956, 961 (1937).

913

Texas Law Review

Vol. 62:893, 1984

40
that allowed both amendments to continue "in full force."'
The adoption of the "repeal" argument would solve the problem

of distinguishing between offensive preemption claims-Ex parte
Young-type cases-and defensive preemption claims in which jurisdiction is barred under the rules of Mottley and Skely Oil 141 The holding
of Exparte Young would apply in full force to fourteenth amendment
claims against states, but federal jurisdiction would be unavailable in
suits between private parties because no private party can engage in
state action so as to violate the fourteenth amendment. 4 2 The wellpleaded complaint rule would hold undisputed sway over the field of
private preemption cases, barring them from federal adjudication.
This approach, however, has a major defect. Because it would use
the fourteenth amendment to evade the eleventh, the only challenges to
state action that the federal courts could hear would be those challenges based on the fourteenth amendment, as opposed to the commerce clause, the privileges and immunities clause, and other
43
constitutional provisions contained in the original document.'
The effect of this limitation is difficult to assess. Lawyers, seeing
the fourteenth amendment as their only way into federal court, might
attempt to phrase all of their constitutional claims in fourteenth
amendment terms. The Court had little difficulty reading the Bill of
Rights into the fourteenth amendment;144 it might read the remainder
140. 209 U.S. at 150. Although Justice Peckham purported to give full effect to both the eleventh and fourteenth amendments, he imposed significant limits on the former. Justice Marshall
considered the effect of the fourteenth amendment on the eleventh an open question as recently as
1974. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 694 n.2 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
While the Court has never accepted the idea that the fourteenth amendment, of its own force,
repeals part of the eleventh amendment, it has recognized that congressional power under § 5 of
the fourteenth amendment may work a partial repeal. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
693-94 (1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
141. See supra notes 35-40, 49-53 and accompanying text.
142. Of course, the Court has construed "state action" quite broadly in its zeal to effectuate
the policies of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961) (finding a privately owned restaurant located in a state-owned parking garage to
be acting as a state for purposes of the fourteenth amendment); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (finding state action in state court's enforcement of racially biased covenants).
143. One preemption case not arising under the fourteenth amendment is E & E Hauling, Inc.
v. Forest Preserve Dist., 613 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1980) (exercising jurisdiction over a suit by a
private party claiming-preemption of a municipal ordinance by the contract clause, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1). This suit, however, would still be cognizable in federal court, because the
eleventh amendment does not bar suits against municipalities and counties. Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
144. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (trial by jury); Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process to obtain witness); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(confrontation with witness); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (assistance of counsel); Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom of association); Everson v.
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of the Constitution into the fourteenth amendment to avoid outrageous
results. The spectacle of an unconstitutional state statute that was not
subject to federal review in any practical fashion might be sufficiently
outrageous to provoke a new incorporation debate.
Regardless of the value of such a reading, this discussion is pure
speculation. The fourteenth amendment has not been construed as a
repeal of any portion of the eleventh amendment.1 4 5 Until such a con-

struction appears, it is more profitable to focus on other justifications
for the rules that govern federal question jurisdiction.
3. A Realistic Approach to Exparte Young.-The most convincing argument in support of the limited application of Exparte Young
requires a recognition of the circumstances surrounding that case. The
decision in Ex parte Young was a practical solution to an important
constitutional problem. 146 Its purpose can only be frustrated by attempts to apply its result-oriented rationale in a different legal context.' 47 For all practical purposes, the decision was a partial repeal of
the eleventh amendment by judicial fiat. To the extent that one recognizes the opinion as justification for a predetermined result, one acts
unwisely in treating the Exparte Young holding as a widely applicable
rule of law.
B. Application of Franchise Tax Board to Action Between Private
Partiesfor a DeclaratoryJudgment of Preemption or
Nonpreemption
As discussed above, 148 a realistic examination of Exparte Young

precludes its use as a jurisdictional basis in suits between private parties. The rationale of Franchise Tax Board, however, supports such
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment of religion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (free exercise of religion); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speech
and press); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (just compensation).
145. But see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 694 n.2 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146. In the nineteenth century, most states, under the principle of sovereign immunity, were
not subject to suit in their own courts. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text. When they
were not immune, they often drafted statutes in ways that made them immune as a practical
matter. The facts of Exparte Young demonstrate the effectiveness of this device. The penalties
for violating the statutory rates were so enormous that it was extremely unlikely that a company
would violate the rate orders, opening itself to criminal prosecution, in order to test the statute's
constitutionality. If the Court had reached the opposite result in Expare Young, there would
have been no practical way for the railroad company to challenge the statute. Of course, Congress
could have solved the problem by exercising its powers under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment,
see supra note 140, but such a solution was not evident to constitutional law scholars of the time.
Thus, the Court should not be criticized excessively for stepping in to solve the problem.
147. Professor Redish has articulated similar fears. M. REDISH, supra note 22, at 157.
148. See supra subpart IV(A)(3).
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jurisdiction. In FranchiseTax Board,149 Justice Brennan relied heavily
on "considerations of comity"' 5 0 in deciding that a suit by a state for a
declaration of nonpreemption does not arise under federal law. In addition to federalism concerns, Justice Brennan emphasized the impor-

tance of flexibility in an area of law involving so many complicated
issues. 151 Citing Skely Oil and Guly, he stressed the significance of
the "spirit of necessity"' 52 in setting jurisdictional bounds. Professor
Cohen has argued that such a flexible approach is appropriate for the
interpretation of the "arising under" language. 53 Recognizing that, as
154
Justice Brennan wrote, the language "masks a welter of issues,"' Cohen advocates a rule that would allow a federal court to delve into the
"pragmatic considerations" of each type of case, determine the relative
merits of federal and state adjudication of the claim in question, and
thus decide whether the pleading states a cause of action arising under
55
federal law.
Application of the Franchise Tax Board analysis to preemption
suits does not support a distinction between "public" suits, in which a
state is a party, and "private" suits, in which the parties are purely private. 156 In many preemption cases, it is certain that federal law governs
the matter in dispute, even if only private parties are involved. t57 In
149. See supra subpart Ill(B).
150. 103 S.Ct. at 2852 n.22.
151. Id. at 2850-51. In elevating flexibility to such a high position among the values to be
weighed in making jurisdictional rules, Justice Brennan necessarily sacrificed predictability. To
this end, he expressly rejected the famous formulation of the "arising under" requirement by
Justice Holmes in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) ("A
suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action."). The Court stated that "Justice
Holmes' test is more useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come within the district
courts' original jurisdiction than it is for describing which cases are beyond district court jurisdiction." 103 S.Ct. at 2846.
152. 103 S.Ct. at 2853.
153. Cohen, supra note 29.
154. 103 S.Ct. at 2846.
155. Cohen, supra note 29, at 906.
156. This Note treats preemption suits between private parties as analytically identical regardless of which party is the nominal plaintiff-the party relying on federal law or the party relying
on state law. This approach seems appropriate in light of the Court's citation of Edelmann in
FranchiseTax Board. 103 S. Ct. at 2851 & n. 19. In a declaratory judgment action between private
parties, the policy considerations that FranchiseTax Board looks to-comity and flexibility-are
equally present regardless of which party is the nominal plaintiff. Edelmann recognizes this and
thus avoids what would be a needlessly technical first-to-file rule. In cases involving states, the
"considerations of comity" stressed in Franchise Tax Board are more pressing, and thus it does
seem to matter which party files suit first.
157. This can be said of most of the landmark cases in the area. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 2890 (1983) (dispute over preemptive force of ERISA); FranchiseTax
Board (dispute over preemptive force of ERISA); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339
U.S. 667 (1950) (dispute over preemptive force of the Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1982)); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
(1908) (dispute over preemptive effect of the Hepburn Act).
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these cases, a strong argument can be made that federal jurisdiction
should exist in private suits as well as in public suits.
One could argue, for example, that the delicate balance of comity
symbolized by the tenth amendment' 58 is much less endangered by federal jurisdiction over private suits than by jurisdiction over public suits.
A rule that allows a federal district court to take jurisdiction over a suit
between private parties seeking a declaration that a state law is preempted-regardless of who raises the preemption issue-might even
ease the tension between the state and federal judicial systems. Fewer
conflicts would be resolved in proceedings in which a state was forced
to justify its own laws to a federal district judge. These issues would be
resolved instead in suits between private parties. This private resolution could be viewed as a further step toward the provision of a "less
intrusive" means of adjudicating the constitutionality of state statutes.' 59 Just as the FDJA soothed the disturbance to state-federal relations that accompanied Exparte Young by allowing individuals to seek
the noncoercive remedy of a declaration that the state law was unenforceable, 60 now some of these conflicts could be resolved without any
state involvement. There is no great danger that the position of the
state would be harmed by such a rule, since the attorney general of the
state could intervene to support the local law if it were of substantial
importance. 1 6' Justice Brennan's analysis in Franchise Tax Board,
therefore, together with a consideration of the purposes of the FDJA,
suggests that federal courts should take jurisdiction over private preemption suits.
C

Stare Decisis, Mottley, andJurisdiction

Although the emphasis in Franchise Tax Board on pragmatism
and flexibility favors expanding federal question jurisdiction to include
private FDJA actions, the principle of stare decisis weighs heavily
158. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
159. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 465-66 (1974); see supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
161. The governor and attorney general of the state are notified whenever a district court of
three judges is convened "[ilf the action is against a State, or officer or agency thereof." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2284(b)(2) (1982). Before 1976, these courts were convened whenever an injunction was sought
against a state statute or administrative order on the grounds of unconstitutionality. Act of June
25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2281). More recently, however, this procedure has been substantially restricted by the repeal of that section. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119. For a more lengthy discussion of the three-judge courts, see 17 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 15, §§ 4234-4235. Furthermore, should the state
receive notice, it would probably be able to intervene if it chose to do so. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
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against such an expansion. Mottley has been on the books for seventyfive years. Skelly Oil applied the Mottley rule to the FDJA thirty years
ago as a matter of first impression. While the precise ramifications of
these doctrines have often been uncertain,1 62 the Court has not yet
found them sufficiently burdensome to require reversal. This Note
concludes that the Court should adhere to the Mottley and Skelly Oil
well-pleaded complaint rule on stare decisis grounds until Congress
sees fit to amend the statute that grants general federal question
jurisdiction.
1. Stare DecisisandReviewable Issues.-The traditional justification for the stare decisis doctrine is the need for stability in the law.
Stability allows private parties to order their affairs based on accurate
evaluations of the legal consequences of their activities. 163 This rationale, however, does not apply in certain contexts. Justice Brandeis
pointed out that "stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right."' 164 He added:
This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious
concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in
cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through
legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often
overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of
experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the
physical sciences, is
process of trial and error, so fruitful in the
appropriate also in the judicial function.' 65
162. See supra Part III.
163. For one expression of this view, see W. DOUGLAS, STARE DEcisis 8 (1949). Professor
Landes and Judge Posner have attempted to balance this need for stability against the pressures
arising out of social change by analyzing precedent as a capital stock, depreciating over time.
Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and EmpiricalAnalysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249
(1976).
164. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932). Some economists maintain that in the absence of market barriers, it matters not at all what the rule of law is, as long as it
is certain. The "winners" and "losers" under the rule will sell their advantages to reach the optimum distribution of resources and risks. See, e.g., Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960); see also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.4 (2d ed. 1972) (applying

the Coase Theorem to incompatible uses of property).
165. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (emphasis added). A
similar view was expressed by Chief Justice Taney:
I . . .am quite willing that it be regarded hereafter as the law of this court, that its
opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is always open to discussion when it is
supposed to have been founded in error, and that its judicial authority should hereafter
depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported.
Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting); see
also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (Brandeis, J.) ("If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely
applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now
been made clear and compels us to do so."); W. DOUGLAS, supra note 163, at 13-14 (discussing the
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For purposes of stare decisis, Brandeis thus divided legal decisions
into two types-reviewable and nonreviewable. He drew the line between those decisions that legislatures may, as a practical possibility,
overrule, and those for which legislative reversal is all but impossible.

The most common type of nonreviewable decision is one involving a
constitutional question, 166 which the legislature cannot overrule by
statute. Although stare decisis has some force even in constitutional
issues,1 67 the standard of review for prior constitutional decisions seems
to be quite permissive. The Court has rather freely rejected those decisions that it felt were wrong. 16 8 This nominal respect accorded to nonreviewable issues contrasts with the Court's reluctance to reverse itself
on reviewable issues. 169 As the next section of this Note demonstrates,
the issue of federal question jurisdiction is best regarded as a reviewable issue upon which the Court should defer to Congress.
Court's application of the principle of stare decisis); Sneed, The Art ofStatutory Interpretation,62
TEXAS L. REv. 665, 683 (1983) (recognizing the Court's reluctance to overrule its constructions of
statutes). It is important to realize that the defects in the courts' interpretation of § 1331 are not
likely to reach constitutional dimensions.
166. At least one nonconstitutional issue has been treated as if it were constitutional--determination of the procedural rules governing the three-judge court statutes. In Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965), the Court justified the inapplicability of stare decisis to these issues in
part by referring to them as important procedural issues. Id at 116. The decisive reason, however, came later, when Justice Harlan noted that the three-judge court statutes, a response to the
antifederalism impact of Exparte Young, are unique in our federal system. Id These statutes can
thus appropriately be regarded as a statutory embodiment of the tenth amendment. While that
amendment has little force of itself to invalidate legislation, it represents an important structural
view that should inform the Court's interpretation of all constitutional issues bearing on the federal system. For a rare case finding Congress to have exceeded the bounds placed on it by the
tenth amendment, see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.),
which was substantially limited in EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983) (Brennan, J.).
167. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
1 (1842)), Justice Brandeis took great pains to point out that Swift had not only failed to bring
about the affirmative benefits expected, but had actually produced "grave discrimination." 304
U.S. at 74. In City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (overruling Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457 (1957)), the Court went out of its way to characterize Morey as "the only case in the last
half century to invalidate a wholly economic regulation solely on equal protection grounds." 427
U.S. at 306. Although Morey had been out of line with constitutional jurisprudence since Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), see L. TRIBE, supra note I, §§ 8-7, 16-2 (describing Morey as
"unique"), it took nineteen years for it to become obvious that Morey was a "sore thumb" that
could not be tolerated.
168. See W. DOUGLAS, supra note 163, at 32-34 (presenting a list of the Court's overruling
decisions).
169. Justice Stevens expressed the rationale for this reluctance as follows:
I am firmly convinced that we have a profound obligation to give recently decided cases
the strongest presumption of validity. . . .The presumption is an essential thread in the
mantle of protection that the law affords the individual. Citizens must have confidence
that the rules on which they rely in ordering their affairs. . . are rules of law and not
merely the opinions of a small group of men who temporarily occupy high office. It is
the unpopular or beleaguered individual-not the man in power-who has the greatest
stake in the integrity of the law.
Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147,
151, 153-54 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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2. CongressionalAction Versus JudicialAction. -Since the "arising under" issue is not constitutional, 170 Congress can reverse the
Court's decision by amending section 1331.171 Thus, the major question is whether changes in jurisdictional conventions should be made
by the Court or by Congress. This issue should be resolved by examining the practical characteristics of the situation.
Congressional "correction" of the Court's jurisdictional "errors" is
extremely rare. The last major revision of the jurisdictional statutes
governing the federal courts was in 1948.172 Despite the recommendations of the American Law Institute, 17 3 Congress has failed to revise the
Judicial Code for thirty-five years.' 74 Notwithstanding the practical
difficulty of congressional repeal of the Court's jurisdictional decisions-the most important consideration in Brandeis' view' 7 5-these
decisions should still be treated as reviewable issues subject to reversal
by Congress rather than the Court. Three reasons support this

conclusion.
First, Congress has the power, which it has exercised on occasion,
76
to overrule truly inconvenient jurisdictional decisions of the Court.'
Because most of the decisions in this area are interpretations of section
1331, Congress has full power to dispose of rules that are no longer
useful. 177 It is bound only by the Osborn rule, 17 8 which interpreted
article III to extend federal question jurisdiction only to "cases" involv170. See supra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
171. 28 U.S.C § 1331 (1982).
172. Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869.
173. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 121 (recommending repudiation of Skeil, Oil's
historical test).
174. The Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), declared the federal bankruptcy court system to be unconstitutional. Yet,
it took Congress two years to provide another bankruptcy statute.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 164-65.
176. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), held that the lower federal courts
were prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act, ch. 231, § 256, 36 Stat. 1162 (1911), from enjoining
relitigation in state courts of issues adjudicated in federal courts. Congress added the phrase "to
protect or effectuate its judgments" to overrule Toucey. Historical and Revision Note to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1982). This intent was effectuated in Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. Richman
Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 514 (1955).
Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853) held that a corporation
was a citizen only of the state in which it was incorporated. Congress chose to treat corporations
also as citizens of the state of their principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982). This
legislative reversal was upheld in several cases. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Richfield Oil Corp., 247 F.
Supp. 407 (C.D. Cal. 1965), af'd,364 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1020 (1967).
Compare Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) (holding the Court of Claims to be a
legislative court), with Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (holding the Court of Claims
to be a constitutional court after expression of congressional intent in 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1982), with
two justices relying on statute); compare Hepburn v. ElIzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1804) (holding
that citizens of the District of Columbia are not citizens of states for the purpose of diversity), with
National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater, 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (upholding congressional intent to the
contrary, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982)).
177. Since all of these cases present "ingredients" of federal law, they are within the constitu-
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ing an "ingredient" of federal law. Congressional reversal of Osborn
79
would require a constitutional amendment and therefore is unlikely. 1
Second, by their very nature, jurisdictional issues are best left to
the legislature. They frequently require the kind of arbitrary linedrawing that is distasteful when done by a judge. Judicial decisions
deal in distinctions and niceties that must be justified by consistent theoretical arguments. Congress, however, can make these distinctions in
any manner that is convenient. Presented with a situation such as federal question jurisdiction, a legislature, unlike a court, does not have to
justify its particular choice of lines.
Finally, instability and unpredictability in jurisdictional issues
have an adverse effect on judicial economy. The less certain the jurisdictional limitations, the more litigation there will be on those issues,
leaving less time for judges to consider substantive issues. Time spent
on jurisdictional questions is, from an economic standpoint, pure
waste.18 0 The expense of a judicial system is justified by its resolution
of substantive disputes and its establishment of rules to shape future
conduct.' 8 t To the extent that time and legal fees are devoted to nonsubstantive issues, the system is inefficient.
Justice Brennan recognized that he was discussing an issue ripe for
statutory reform, yet unsuited for judicial revision, in his discussion of
the meaning of "arising under" in FranchiseTax Board:
Commentators have repeatedly proposed that some mechanism
be established to permit removal of cases in which a federal defense may be dispositive.
It is not beyond the power of Congress to confer a right to a
declaratory judgment in a case or controversy arising under federal law-within the meaning of the Constitution or of § 1331without regard to Skely Oil[]. . . . At this point, any adjustment
in the system that has evolved under the Skely Oil rule must
come from Congress.
• . . [U]ntil Congress informs us otherwise, such a suit is not
within 8the
original jurisdiction of the United States district
2
courts.'

tional grant. The question is whether they fall within the language of § 1331. See supra notes 2023 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
179. The process of constitutional amendment is set out in U.S. CONsT. art. V.
180. See R. POSNER, supra note 164, § 21.1, at 429-30 (arguing that increases in procedural
cost must be justified by more accurate results).
181. See id § 19.1, at 401-02.
182. 103 S. Ct. at 2847 n.9, 2851 n.17, 2853.
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Conclusion

The Court's analysis in Franchise Tax Board suggests that it will
take a more practical view of the federal question statute's "arising
under" requirement than it has in the past. Faced with a complex
problem, Justice Brennan gave great weight to "considerations of comity" in reaching his decision. While this analysis offers no support for
the distinction between private and public preemption suits, it should
not be assumed on the basis of FranchiseTax Board that the Motley
and Skelly Oil well-pleaded complaint rule is dead. Any practical
reading of the "arising under" language will necessarily take into account the importance of judicial stability in jurisdictional decisions.
Whatever its defects or merits, the rule of Mottley, as applied in FDJA
actions by Skelly Oil, should remain in force until Congress changes it.
Similarly, the Court should continue to analyze new problems just
as it did in Franchise Tax Board Faced with preemption claims by
states, it should allow the exercise of jurisdiction. Use of the "arising
under" language to impress the Court's concerns regarding comity
upon the federal jurisdictional statutes should not be condemned as
judicial activism or interpretivism. Section 1331 has never been susceptible to a literal reading. As it enters its second century, it is properly treated, as it always has been treated, as a useful tool for balancing
local and national interests through definition of the boundaries of the
federal jurisdictional power.
Ronald J. Mann
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